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ARTICLE
Co-seeing and seeing through: reimagining Kant’s
subtraction argument with Stumpf and Husserl
Clare Mac Cumhaill
Philosophy, Durham University, Durham, UK
ABSTRACT
I draw on Carl Stumpf’s essay “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie” (1891), and
his precocious On the Psychological Origin of the Idea of Space (1873), to set
out a charge he raises against Kant’s form/matter distinction. The charge rests,
I propose, on the supposition that colourless extension, or empty space,
cannot be seen. I consider an objection that Stumpf raises against Kant’s
notorious ‘subtraction’ argument. Kant supposes that we can ‘take away’ from
the representation of a body all that the understanding thinks in relation to it
and extension would yet remain (Remainder), separate from all sensation
(Separateness). Stumpf denies both claims but I suggest he needn’t. I outline a
way of defending Remainder without Separateness, extrapolating from some
neglected descriptive phenomenology in Husserl’s 1907 “Thing and Space”
lectures: we see empty regions insofar as we see things through them. Finally,
by appeal to so-called ‘structural’ features of visual experience, I detail a
distinctive approach to making the subtraction argument intelligible.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 26 February 2019; Revised 6 October 2019; Accepted 16 November 2019
KEYWORDS Kant’s subtraction argument; empty space; perception; Husserl; Carl Stumpf
1. A puzzle
In the ﬁrst book of the Treatise, Hume argues that our idea of a vacuum is ﬁcti-
tious. There is no visual impression from which the idea of a vacuum – an
empty space – can be copied (Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume,
288–90). Ideas, moreover, are faint images of impressions. But as there can
be no impression of an empty region – of an intangible, invisible distance –
nor can there be any image of such.1 Instead, a “true idea of extension” is
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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1See Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self in Hume’s Treatise, for discussion of Hume’s treatment of space and
how he circumvents his own copy principle in the case of betweennesses – relations between things, or
what I will later call interspaces.
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derived from complex impressions of perceptual minima – “colour’d points” –
“dispos’d in a certain manner” (A Treatise of Human Nature, 82).
C.D. Broad insists that there is “nothing whatever in Hume’s doctrine of
space except a great deal of ingenuity wasted in recommending and defend-
ing palpable nonsense”; it is “very queer stuﬀ indeed”, “rubbish” (“Hume’s
Doctrine of Space”, 161–76). Yet with respect the related question “can
there be an extended mental image…which has no imaginal quality corre-
sponding to either sensible colour… or any other sensual quality?”, he
tends to agree with Hume, at least as he reads him: “The answer seems
pretty obviously to be: No!” (“Hume’s Doctrine of Space”, 163).
In this paper, I consider a treatment of empty space which chimes in
certain respects with Hume’s dismissal, and which shares the introspective
phenomenological intuitions of Broad – that oﬀered by the so-called
father of Gestalt Psychology and student of Brentano, Carl Stumpf. My com-
ments are restricted to his 1891 essay “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie”
(P&E), a translation of which is published in this volume, and to his preco-
cious Über den Psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung (UR) written
in 1873, when he was just 25. In both works, Stumpf is concerned to cast
doubt on the form/matter distinction, as he attributes it to Kant, and
which he claims is “psychologically completely indefensible”. I call this
Stumpf’s Charge.2
The plan for the paper is as follows. In the ﬁrst half, I detail the motivations
for Stumpf’s Charge and its scope, before recruiting some descriptive phenom-
enology from Husserl (Thing and Space Lectures) to unsettle its force. Empty
regions are co-seenwith objects that ‘border’ them, in a sense to be explained.
In the second part, I turn to the phenomenology which Stumpf appears to
share with Broad against Kant’s notorious ‘subtraction’ argument. Kant con-
tends in his ﬁrst critique that:
[I]f I take away from the representation of a body that which the understanding
thinks in regard to it, substance force, divisibility etc., and likewise what belongs
to sensation, impenetrability, hardness, colour etc., something still remains over
from this empirical intuition namely, extension and shape.
(A21)
But for Stumpf:
[I]t is impossible to present space, extension and ﬁgure without any sensory
qualities. I know of only a single author, who in this point openly sides with Kant.
(P&E, 10, Textor and Leech trans.)3
2I focus speciﬁcally on the charge as it applies to space. The respect in which it applies to time as a form of
intuition, I leave aside. Thanks to a reviewer for suggesting this explicit gloss.
3That author was Otto Liebmann. Liebmann claimed he could imagine senseless shapes, a proposition
Stumpf deems as confused since visible shape must involve a ﬁgure/ground contrast. Stumpf also
refers to Hermann Cohen, who had criticized Stumpf’s interpretation of Kant. Thanks to a reviewer
for suggesting this note.
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Since Stumpf is responding to Kant’s ‘subtraction’ argument, we can take it, I
think, that like Broad he also supposes that there can be nomental image that
does not have ‘sensual quality’, though prima facie the above passage reads as
neutral between the presentation of space in imagination (say) and its pres-
entation in perception. But here recent scholarship on Kant can be called
upon to rescue Kant, even before we get started.
Kant distinguishes the notion of a form of intuition from formal intuitions, a
distinction which Stumpf appears to overlook (though see P&E, fn. 11). Formal
intuitions are those sensible geometric forms that are produced through con-
struction; for instance, when a geometer demonstrates Euclid’s angle-sum
theorem by constructing its proof with pen and paper. Such spatial objects
– the shapes on the page – instantiate the properties of the form of intuition
of space which can thereby be cognized. The investigation of such properties
is hence synthetic a priori.4
The subtraction argument pertains to forms of intuition and not to
formal intuitions which are sensible forms, whether those sensible forms
are ‘outer’ objects that appear in empirical intuitions or are forms that
are successively generated through the productive imagination. But strictly
speaking, Stumpf’s objection chieﬂy targets formal intuitions which Kant
would surely insist are essentially sensible. Even so, there remains some-
thing important to be gleaned from Stumpf’s peculiar objection to the sub-
traction argument, particularly as he develops it in his earlier Raumbuch
(the Ursprung).
Stumpf advances an argument that I think helps home in on the peculiar
appearance that empty regions have; as I argue, we can intelligibly say that
empty regions look ‘see-through’ insofar as something is seen through
them. Unlike the appearance of sensible forms however, such a way of
appearing cannot be replicated in imagination. In visual imagination a per-
spective is only represented, not inhabited, in a sense to be made plain – so
here I am inclined to partially agree with Stumpf in his quibble with Kant.
At the same time, I want to suggest that recognizing this much goes some
way to reconciling the Broad/Stumpf intuition with the descriptive phenom-
enology of Husserl and I explain in what sense.
A note about methodology. This essay is avowedly synthetic, as well as
selective in the material that it draws upon from its historical protagonists.
As such, it is less scholarly than might be expected – and its conclusions
are theoretical. The idea is to assemble conceptual resources that may well
have relevance for the contemporary philosopher of perception for whom
the problem of seeing or imagining empty space is hard to even countenance.
4For extensive discussion of this distinction see Onof and Schulting, “Space as Form of Intuition”. For con-
sideration of Stumpf’s take on Kantian a priori judgment, see Fissette and Martinelli, Philosophy from an
Empirical Standpoint, 25.
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This is mostly due to an over-reliance on what Stumpf would call genetic-
causal psychology, a psychology that emphasizes causal genesis and third
personal methods, often without appeal to other source – to phenomenology,
or to the history of philosophy.
2. Stumpf’s charge
Stumpf (1848–1936) was a student, ﬁrst of Brentano and then Hermann
Lotze.5 He was Husserl’s habilitation supervisor at Halle (1887), and a friend
of William James, who in the Principles of Psychology describes Stumpf as
“the most philosophical and profound” (911) of all those theorists on whom
his sensationalist account draws.6 Unlike Brentano, however, Stumpf never
tried to make disciples of his students, an orientation which is said to owe
much to the “exceptional” and “considerate” theoretical liberality of Lotze.7
Despite this, he widely thought of as the father of Gestalt Psychology.
Among his pupils at the Berlin Institute of Psychology which he founded in
1900 were Wolfgang Köhler, Kurt Koﬀka, and Max Wertheimer. Husserl’s
Logical Investigations (1900–1901) is dedicated to Stumpf “with honour and
in friendship”; its Book III, as we will shortly see, is indebted to him.
I begin by considering Stumpf’s Charge, its motivations and scope, as set
out in his lecture “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie” (P&E, trans. Textor
and Leech).
Stumpf teaches that the motive for Kant’s form/matter distinction is epis-
temological; it is introduced to make sense of the possibility of synthetic a
priori judgement, an important class of which judgements are mathematical.
Thus, in his ﬁrst critique we ﬁnd Kant writing:
Philosophical cognition is rational cognition from concepts, mathematical cog-
nition is that from the construction of concepts. But to construct a concept
means to exhibit a priori the intuition corresponding to it. For the construction
of a concept, therefore, non-empirical intuition is required, which consequently,
as intuition, is an individual object… Thus I construct a triangle by exhibiting an
object corresponding to this concept, either through mere imagination, in pure
intuition, or on paper, in empirical intuition, but in both cases completely a priori.
(A713-14/B741-42)
How is the form/matter distinction intimated in this passage? “The sum of the
interior angles of a triangle is 180°” is a synthetic a priori judgement. It is a
priori since it applies independently of all experience with strict universality.
It is synthetic since it is grounded in the construction, either in pure or
5For an outline of Stumpf’s place in the school of Brentano, see Rollinger, Husserl’s Position in the School of
Brentano. For discussion of Stumpf’s indebtedness to Lotze, see Centi, “Stumpf and Lotze on Space,
Reality, Relation”.
6Among them Herring, Volkmann, Leconte and Schon.
7Lotze is said to have told readers to regard his philosophy as “an open market”, and to pass by the goods
they did not want (Milkov, “Carl Stumpf’s Debt to Hermann Lotze”, 13).
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empirical intuition, of sensible forms – triangles, for instance. Thus, while the
intuition determined is non-empirical, it is epistemically determined through a
constructive process that exhibits its properties, a process that involves the
production of sensible intuitive forms.8
Stumpf rejects this way of conceiving matters; “what is epistemologically
true”, cannot be “psychologically false”, he says. And by his lights the form/
matter distinction is psychologically completely indefensible’ (10). This is
Stumpf’s Charge. But why does he think it so? And what can be gleaned
from his phenomenological certainty in this respect?
Stumpf grants that “it is an indubitable truth” (P&E, 4) both that there are
synthetic or unifying acts of thinking – for instance, when we judge two
objects to be causally related – and that it is a function of consciousness to
unify. Yet “the core question remains” he says: “What may, can, must we
unify, and what not?”
He goes on to single out as “remarkable” (P&E, 8) the Kantian notion of
“aﬃnity” that appears in the Transcendental Deduction of the ﬁrst edition
of the Critique (absent in the B edition). “Aﬃnity” pertains to the “associability
of appearances”. Kant insists that appearances must be associable in them-
selves but then adds – “regrettably” for Stumpf – that the objective ground
of this association cannot be encountered anywhere but in the “principle of
the unity of apperception” (A122). Unity, that is, cannot be perceived in what
is given sensibly (P&E, 9). This is where Stumpf will disagree, ﬁnding in Kant’s
form/matter distinction the source and nub of, as he puts it, the “[complete
resistance to allow] that which is given sensibly to us to become authoritative”.
Why does Stumpf come to this conclusion?
Stumpf thinks that Kant’s form/matter distinction, despite its epistemo-
logical motivation, demands that a distinction be made within sensory per-
ception that is ‘psychologically false’, namely the idea that space and time
are mere forms of intuition in contrast to sensory qualities.9 Recall Kant
maintains that “that within which the sensations [the manifold of appear-
ance] can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in
turn sensation” (A20/B34). Now, while this might at once suggest that
space cannot be part of the content or matter of experience, this is not
in fact Kant’s assumption – as noted, he distinguishes forms of intuition
from intuitive forms. Stumpf, however, does seem to attribute some
such thought to Kant for his disagreement takes the following shape. He
notes that:
8For discussion of whether production solely in imagination is suﬃcient, see Friedman, “Kant on Geometry
and Spatial Intuition” and compare Shabel, “Kant’s Argument from Geometry”.
9Stumpf opposes this distinction on descriptive, rather than genetic, grounds. See Fissette and Martinelli,
Philosophy from an Empirical Standpoint, 322 on the genetic/descriptive distinction.
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We do not perceive diﬀerent sense qualities in invariable extension and at invari-
able locations, but with continually changing spatial determinations.
(P&E, 12)
This is a simple enough observation. When we observe a change in visual
quality there is a concomitant change in the spatial determination of that
quality. For instance, when one moves away from a table with a yellow jug,
one might be said to see ‘less’ yellow. For Stumpf this simple observation
points to a more conclusive lesson. He maintains that it is impossible to
present space, extension and ﬁgure “without any sensory qualities” (P&E, 10),
and he treats this in turn as a direct challenge to the psychological adequacy
of Kant’s form/matter distinction. I return to this idea shortly. First, I make
more precise the relation between colour and extension gestured at here.
In his 1873 treatise, Stumpf introduces the notion of ‘Teilinhalt’ or ‘partial’
contents.10 Colour and extension are “partial contents” he says since:
they cannot exist separately in a presentation because of their nature, they
cannot be presented separately. From this follows immediately or it is already
said by this that space is just as originally and directly perceived as the quality
… not only are both contents perceived and presented together now, but
already in the ﬁrsts moments of consciousness one is given with the other.
(my emphasis Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung, 114)
So, Stumpf maintains that it is part of the nature of colour and extension that
they cannot exist in a presentation or be presented separately; to borrow a
term of art which we will encounter later in Husserl, one which arguably
has a forerunner in Stumpf’s use of mitvorstellen’ in the Ursprung (16),11 it
might be said that colour and extent are co-seen. But if so, we can read
Stumpf as rejecting two claims that can be teased apart in Kant.
Separateness
[W]hile the matter of all appearance is given to us a posteriori only, its form must
lie ready for the sensations a priori in the mind, and so must allow of being con-
sidered apart from all sensation.
(CPR, TA, §1, A20)
Remainder
Thus, if I take away from the representation of a body that which the under-
standing thinks in regard to it, substance force, divisibility etc., and likewise
what belongs to sensation, impenetrability, hardness, colour etc., something
still remains over from this empirical intuition namely, extension and shape.
(A21)
10For detailed exposition of the concept of partial contents see Textor, “Apprehending a Multitude as a
Unity”.
11Stumpf describes seeing the space between two places as co-seen when one sees both places. Thanks to
Mark Textor for corroboration of this use.
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For Kant, what remains over (Remainder) apart from all sensation (Separate-
ness) is colourless extension.
Now, I have cast Stumpf as insisting that colour is co-seen with form, yet it
seems that he goes further than this. He seems to hold that we cannot see
colourless extension for he writes: “we present quality in extension, extension
in quality; they interpenetrate each other” (Ursprung der Raumvorstellung, 114,
my emphasis). But, as such, it might be thought that by Stumpf’s lights there
simply is no perception of empty space, a hunch that the following passage
from the Ursprung treatise seems to recommend:
One cannot represent space without quality, e.g. visually but without colour, tac-
tually without tactual feeling, completely separate from all sensing.
(UR, 19/20)
In §3, I will suggest that this supposition, assuming that it is attributable to
Stumpf, is problematic.12 Why? For if the psychological indefensibility of the
form/matter distinction rests not only on the observation that colour is co-
seen with form or extent but also the insistence that empty space is not
seen, and if it can be shown that empty space is seen, even while it is
granted that colour and form are co-seen, then there may be grounds for
unsettling Stumpf’s Charge. I show that there are such grounds by drawing
on Husserl’s 1907 “Thing and Space” lectures (Thing and Space Lectures).
3. Data from the summer semester, Göttingen 1907
Fisette, “Stumpf and Husserl on Phenomenology”, distinguishes two periods
in the work of Husserl that are relevant to a consideration of his relation to
Stumpf: the Halle period (1886–1901), which includes the Logical Investi-
gations (1900–1901), and the Göttingen period (1901–1916), which begins
with his arrival in Göttingen in 1901, and includes the 1907 “Thing and
Space” lectures. While in his posthumous Erkenntnislehre (1939) Stumpf is criti-
cal of the transcendental turn that Husserl’s phenomenology takes during the
course of the Göttingen period, Husserl’s earlier work is wholly in the descrip-
tive psychological spirit of his onetime ‘fatherly friend’ (Schuhmann, “Malvine
Husserls’ Skizze eines Lebensbildes von E. Husserl”, 114). For our purposes,
particularly noteworthy is Book III of the Logical Investigations, entitled “On
the Theory of Wholes and Parts”. This work picks up the Stumpﬁan notion
of Teilinhalt, but also the Brentanian notion of a ‘foundation’, which I will
gloss only brieﬂy.
12As a reviewer notes, Stumpf devotes the long second chapter of Ursprung der Raumvorstellung to the
presentation of the third dimension (154–271). In my view, consideration of what is involved in the rep-
resentation of the third dimension – or seeing in depth – is distinct from consideration in what is
involved in seeing empty space. The latter posits empty space as an object of perceptual experience
and considers how it strikes the perceiver – viz. the phenomenology of being acquainted with an
empty region. The former considers the appearance of things as ordered in space. My discussion
mostly leaves aside consideration of seeing in depth.
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Husserl explains the idea of a foundation as follows: when part A cannot be
presented without a part B, A is said to be founded on B (LI III, §14). He notes
too that foundedness relations can be reciprocal or one-sided, oﬀering the
relation of colour to extent as an example of a reciprocal relation. To this
extent then Husserl might be supposed to agree with Stumpf, whose reﬂec-
tions on these matters he variously refers to as “powerful”, “valuable” and
“instructive”.13 Yet importantly Husserl also adds in these pages a caveat, or
so it seems to me. He records Stumpf as urging that “quality is indeed
aﬀected in sympathy with changes in extent” (Über den psychologischen
Ursprung der Raumvorstellung, 112), but he thinks the import of this insight
should receive a diﬀerent emphasis:
Stumpf uses considerations of this sort to prove the mutual inseparability of
Extension and Quality, and hence their non-independence: we shall rather
make use of them to deﬁne inseparability or non-independence, or contrariwise
separability or independence.
(my emphasis, LI III, §5, Vol. 2, 9)
Thus, where Stumpf thinks that the co-presentation of colour with space dis-
proves the form/matter distinction on Kantian lines, Husserl might be read as
making a weaker claim, namely that the co-presentation of colour with space
only deﬁnes non-independence which applies equally to, and is characteristic
of, other perceptual phenomena – for instance, there is “no tactile quality
without something spatial… no timbre without tone qualities” (LI VI, §2).
Further, while Husserl does appear to hold that the relation of extent and
colour is reciprocal, his argument pertains to the presentation of colour in
‘thought’ – he writes that no colour is thinkable without extension and vice
versa (§16, Vol. 2, 27). But this leaves open the possibility that while colour
is reciprocally founded on extension with respect to what is thinkable, it may
not be reciprocally founded on extension with respect to perception. Colour,
that is, may only be one-sidely founded on extent.14 I pick up this issue
shortly as it is relevant to my consideration of Stumpf’s way of responding
13For full elucidation of the ways in which Husserl and Stumpf diﬀer with respect to the Brentanian notion
of ‘foundation’ and associated concepts, see Rollinger, Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano, Ch3,
especially 111–12.
14Rollinger, Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano, notes an asymmetry that chimes, I suggest, with
Husserl’s later phenomenology:
The extension and color of the extended colored surface, according to Stumpf, are inseparable
from each other. While this certainly seems to be the case, it should also be pointed out that
Stumpf’s thought-experiment can be pursued further to show that the extension is not
related to the color precisely as the color is related to the extension. It is indeed quite clear
that changes in the color participate in changes in the extension, that there is, as it were,
less color if there is less extension, and again more color with more extension. It must be
asked, however, whether the extension likewise changes in accordance with changes in the
color. If a red surface has yellow added to it and thereby becomes orange, while it remains
the same in other possible respects, does its extension in any way at all change? Apparently
it does not. (105–106)
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to Kant’s subtraction argument. Before that I sketch the position that Husserl
begins to explicitly take with respect to space around the time that he delivers
the 1907 “Thing and Space” lectures in the summer semester at Göttingen.
While the Investigations might be said to oﬀer a phenomeno-logic – this is
insofar as it sets out the structures, and so essences of what is given in experi-
ence – the “Thing and Space” lectures, together with the ﬁve lectures which
proceeded them (published in 1947 under the title The Idea of Phenomenol-
ogy) herald Husserl’s pioneering advance towards transcendental phenomen-
ology. This change in orientation can be characterized in the following way.
The phenomeno-logic of the Investigations avoids the perils of psychologism
by denying that the logic of appearances (and indeed logic tout court) is to be
grounded in psychology and by concentrating instead on the nature of the
objects of perceptual awareness.15 In the Thing and Space Lectures, we likewise
ﬁnd Husserl writing that “space is a necessary form of things and is not a form
of lived experience” (my emphasis, §14, 20–22). Like Stumpf then Husserl con-
tinues to reject the Kantian conception of space as a form of intuition. Yet he
now adds a speciﬁcation: “[space is] speciﬁcally not [a form] of ‘sensuous’ lived
experience” (§14, 23). What is the signiﬁcance of this appeal to the sensuous?
Here, Husserl can be said to agree with Stumpf, as well as his earlier self,
that space is not a form of intuition but is intuitively given. Yet at the same
time he might be thought to depart from Stumpf, at least in this respect.
Stumpf can be understood to agree with Kant to the extent that he takes
the categories of form andmatter to have traction, where matter here pertains
to quality. However, the Husserl of the Things and Space Lectures now treats of
the matter of experience not in terms of quality or sensuous experience, but in
terms of things, something that is already partly in evidence in the Investi-
gations. But this signiﬁcantly changes the shape and nature of his enquiry. I
explain by way of some biographical context.
In the autumn of 1906, Husserl underwent a ‘severe crisis’,16 recording in
his daily journal doubts concerning his existence as a philosopher and
setting out what his primary task must be. In the ﬁrst couple of pages of
the 1907 lectures, we see a glimpse of what that task amounts to:
In order to solve the problems of the constitution of natural scientiﬁc reality in
the context of the variegated cognitions and cognitive nexuses of natural
science, we would need to settle the problems posed by logical-mathematical
thinking and to clarify, from the side of experiential cognition, not only the
lower levels of the experience which lies prior to all deduction and induction –
in short, prior to all logically mediated cognition in the usual sense – but also,
and a fortiori, we would need to clarify the higher levels.
15For a gloss on Husserl’s critique of psychologism, see Kusch, “Psychologism”.
16See Rojcewicz’s translator’s note to the 1907 Thing and Space lectures (Thing and Space Lectures, xii),
where this description, which in fact was given by the editor of the ﬁve introductory lectures that
resulted in the Idea of Phenomenology, are discussed.
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These are very lofty goals to which we gaze up wistfully, but which we cannot at
all seriously set for ourselves here and now. The ﬁrst elaboration of the ﬁeld of
experience, its phenomena and givens, will oﬀer us an ample supply of diﬃcult
and deep problems. We will do well if we cultivate this ﬁeld so eﬀectively that
our successors can then attempt to raise the higher forms of the problems.
(1–2)
A short gloss helps makes sense of this passage. For Husserl, the ‘thing’ of the
title of the lectures Thing and Space Lectures should be read as an “object of
straightforward experience” (Appendix II, 297). But since it is straightforward
experience that science must have recourse to, Husserl thinks – as he
writes, experience is prior to all deduction and induction – the possibility of
science can only be understood once the possibility of the straightforward
experience on which it is founded is itself understood.
In particular, it seems that Husserl’s goal was to provide phenomenological
grounds for the new non-Euclidean geometry; to make plausible a topological
(and not a metrical) analysis of the constitution of corporeality and of space,
something that his earlier work at Halle on the Philosophy of Arithmetic and
Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie, a collection of manuscripts from 1886
to 1901 and published posthumously (see Haddock, “Husserl and Riemann”
for discussion of the latter) prepared him for (see Appendix XII, 339–40). Top-
ology treats of space as a continuous ordering of points such that the same
space can survive deformations such as stretching, twisting, and contraction.
What matters only for the integrity of a space is the path-connectedness of its
points; two points are path-connected if they share the same space. In con-
trast, in a metric space, distance relations between points are deﬁned. It is
thus not possible to deform a metric space and for metric relations to be pre-
served. We shall shortly see how Husserl thinks he can develop an account of
the topological constitution of space. First, I note two areas where the Göttin-
gen Husserl of the “Thing and Space” lectures diverges from Stumpf.
Husserl contends that descriptive psychology such as Stumpf’s already
takes the possibility of straightforward experience for granted, since it
“implies transcendences” – that is, it takes for granted the objective consti-
tution things, the very possibility of which is the task for a pure
phenomenology:
As long as descriptive psychology is, in the genuine sense, psychology, then, no
matter how narrowly delimited, it is entirely on a par with genetic-causal psy-
chology. As such, we must not lay claim to it, since it implies transcendences.
And it actually implies transcendences as long as it is still some sort of psychol-
ogy.
(cited at fn. 14, 1997, xix)
To get a sense of how a descriptive phenomenology might imply transcen-
dences, consider Husserl’s discussion of the work of the Scottish philosopher
Alexander Bain which he came to know through Stumpf’s lengthy exposition
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and critique of it in the Ursprung (1873, 36–71).17 Where Kant has it that forms
of intuition order sensation in space and time, Bain proposes that a peculiar
‘muscle’ sense is responsible for the fact that what is seen and touched
appears in a spatial order (Claesges, “Editors Introduction”, xxvi). But Husserl
contends that this appeal to a ‘muscle sense’ is only intelligible once certain
determinate physiological and anatomical presuppositions are made – to
wit, transcendent presuppositions – and he instead introduces the term
‘kinaesthetic’ to describe the mere sensation of movement, sensation or
feeling now stripped of any transcendent anatomical presuppositions.
For instance, what we might otherwise call ‘eye movements’ are now to be
identiﬁed with continuous sequences of kinaesthetic sensation that are
correlated with ampliﬁcations and modiﬁcations of the two-dimensional
visual sense-ﬁeld. Such sensations are not essentially related to visual sen-
sations as colour is essentially related to extent however, they are functionally
related.
The passage below illustrates this line of thinking. Notice that the parenth-
eses contain an otherwise transcendent assumption. Here ‘K’ pertains to
kinaesthetic sensation and ‘i’ the visual image:
If the kinaesthetic ocular sensation K1 is at ﬁrst… constant (thus, Objectively
speaking, the eye is stationary) perhaps during the stream of time t0-t1, then
the visual image i1 is also constant during precisely this time. If then K1
changes in a continuous sequence, during the new span of time t1-t2 into K2
then the image i1 also changes into i2. If K2 reverts back to K1 then so does i2
into i1 in the same span.
(§51, 149)
Hand, head, and trunk movements are likewise said to be ‘associated’with dis-
tinct K-series, changes in which also lead to concomitant changes in the i-
series. Such associations are said to be ‘immanent’ – no transcendences are
implied.18
Now, for Husserl, Stumpf’s work is not free of such implications. While
Husserl has it that the association of two dimensional visual images with
various K-factors transforms the visual ﬁeld into an objective spatial ﬁeld,
for Stumpf, depth is given necessarily and immediately whenever a surface
is visually presented; he notes that presented surfaces can be plane or
uneven, but “planeness or unevenness […] involve the third dimension”
(Über den psychologischen Ursprung, 177). In a stenographic remark in his
copy of Stumpf’s book, Husserl adds a note on this comment:
We do not see surfaces, but the visual ﬁeld is a two-dimensional manifold. The
mistake [Stumpf’s] lies in the equivocal concept of surface: 1) surface: two-
17As Pradelle, “The Autonomy of the Sensible”, 239, explains, Stumpf also objects to Bain inasmuch as his
project is to replace our everyday intuition of space with what amounts to a theoretical construct.
18For further detailed see Scheerer, “The Constitution of Space Perception”.
BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 11
dimensional manifold, 2) surface: formation, and speciﬁcally a two-dimensional
formation in space.
(cited at fn. 60, Thing and Space Lectures, xxvii)
It seems then that Husserl thinks that Stumpf helps himself to the transcen-
dent notion of a formation in space – a corporeal form or voluminous
object – but where the possibility of experiencing such a formation, a thing,
is precisely what needs to be accounted for. I return to Husserl’s critique in
§4, where I shall in fact side with Stumpf. To close this section, I set out Hus-
serl’s descriptive phenomenology, appeal to which I will take as suﬃcient to
unsettle Stumpf’s Charge along the lines I will suggest.
The following passage appears in Appendix VII (to §76), written in 1909,
two years after the ‘Thing and Space’ lectures were ﬁrst delivered. The
passage is striking insofar as Husserl recognizes that empty space is proble-
matic for his own account:
[I]f we look deeper and more closely into the phenomenon of spatial intuition,
then, with a little honesty, which, to be sure, is not easy to come by, we cannot
escape the thought that we see the “between” and the entirety of space. If I cast
my eye on these or those edges of a seen cavity, or of a hollow space formed by
books, tables, etc. And if I transfer my gaze from these edges to the opposite
ones, then I “see the air”, the “between”. I can attend to these or those interven-
ing points or intervening positions, without interesting myself at all in the form
of the type of the border.
Is there not an essential diﬀerence here between such spatial distance, the way the
“between” is “given”, and chromatic distance, where we are given no “between” (in
the sense of a color)? This or that thing is always given, and speciﬁcally in a space…
One can cudgel one’s brains about this, but one must still face the facts and
begin with them… . What sort of distinction this is, i.e. the seeing of colour
versus the “seeing” (or other perceiving) of space, is a problem.
(324)
Perhaps in the metres of untranslated Husserliana housed in Leuven, Husserl
resolves this problem. Without that resolution, I instead gather together the
scattered reﬂections we ﬁnd in the above passage alone.
Husserl’s descriptive phenomenology appears to suggest that:
(1) We see the ‘between’ (a sort of cavity or hollow)
(2) We see the entirety of space
(3) We can attend to the ‘between’ without interest in the form of the border
But to these reﬂections, I suggest we can add a fourth, namely by returning
to §76, which marks the beginning of a new lecture entitled “The modes of
givenness of empty space”. However to bring the signiﬁcance of this lecture
into view, however, a step back is also needed.
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As I have noted, Husserl’s project in the lectures is partly to make plausible a
topological and not a metrical analysis of the constitution of corporeality and
space, an account of which can found the new non-Euclidean geometry.19
In the course of his elaboration, however, Husserl also explicitly harnesses
the conceptual tools of that programme. Thus, we ﬁnd a ‘phenomenologica-
lized’ appeal to notions of rotation, free variation (in imagination), transform-
ation, invariance and manifold (Mannigfaltigkeit), now understood
topologically in terms of a continuous variation in sensation. Consider how at
least some of these notions play out in his descriptive phenomenology. I para-
phrase: A thing (objectively speaking) is such that the way it looks to a subject
can vary with movement. When you approach a body it may look to you to
‘expand’ on movement. When you retreat, it may look to grow smaller or ‘con-
tract’ (a one-dimensional linearmanifold of ‘receding’). Likewise, in encircling it
(a two-dimensional cyclical manifold of ‘turning’), it may appear to you as
though respective sides ‘replace themselves’ so that – to use Husserl’s words
– “the sides are joined to one another as continuous … they bring to appear-
ance the closedness of the nexus of the sides and thereforemake the complete
corporeal surface appear as a ‘closed’ one” (Thing and Space Lectures, 214, §72,
lines 30–34). A thing or corporeality is constituted by these patterns of ‘expan-
sion’ and ‘contraction’, ‘concealment’ and ‘replacement’ – “to be constituted
in such a way pertains irrevocably to the essence of a body” (Thing and Space
Lectures, 219, §72, lines 20–21). In contrast, empty space admits of no such
modiﬁcation; when you move through it, it does not seem to loom or contract;
it does not seem to you to have sides that replace each other on movement.
Compare the sky:
[I]f, e.g. the blue of the sky appears as a vault and is thereby interpreted as a
body, then this body must indeed have its front and back and its closed
surface, which must be constituted in possible transitions, in possible cyclical
turnings, etc.
(Thing and Space Lectures, lines 17–20)
We don’t, however, suppose that the sky has sides in this sense, and the same
is true of empty space. Rather, empty space, at least as it is “conceivable within
the domain of mere vision”, says Husserl, is the ‘residue’ of visual content
which “cannot be accommodated to the yoke of the apprehension of the
thing” (Thing and Space Lectures, 220, §74, lines 6–8). That is to say, empty
space does not seem to ‘expand’ and ‘contract’ with the coloured expanses
that cue awareness of the presence of objects. We can cast this observation
intuitively: When you approach an opaque object, its facing surface looks to
you to ‘expand’. When you retreat, it may look to contract and ‘what is left
over’ – the visual residue – may look to you to be augmented (viz. there is
19For discussions see Tiezen, “Free Variation and the Intuition of Geometric Essences”. and Hartimo, “From
Geometry to Phenomenology”.
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more of it). In both cases, however, the residue itself neither expands nor con-
tracts. Nonetheless, it is only by seeing the residue, qua residue, that you can
apprehend the ‘expansion’ or ‘contraction’ that cues the awareness of a non-
residual material object. Insofar as this characterization rings true, we can add
(4) to (1)–(3) above.
(4) Empty space is a kind of visual residue
But this in turn suggests a tempting line of thought.
If this reading of the Göttingen Husserl is on the right track then Husserl
might be said, tentatively I admit, to endorse Remainder, at least at this
period – after all, empty space is the co-seen visual residue that cues aware-
ness of corporealities. Further, it seems he thinks that we can attend to the
‘between’ without interest in the form of the border (1, 3). At the same
time, the very requirement for a border suggests a rejection of Separateness
(“empty space is necessarily an empty space between things”). Why?
Because the closed nexi that constitute non-residual corporealities are co-
seen with the betweenness or visual residue that cannot be “accommodated
to the yolk of the apprehension of the thing”. Instead, patterns of expansion
and contraction unfold against a backdrop – the entirety of space (2) – which
includes empty regions between things.20 I revisit this last point in §5. For now,
return to Stumpf’s Charge.
Stumpf seems to think that not only is colour given with extent, but vice
versa. As such, he might be thought to suppose that we do not see colour-
less extension – a claim I have attributed to him – which in turn might be
supposed to make entirely psychologically indefensible the form/matter dis-
tinction which Kant’s epistemology motivates. If Husserl’s descriptive phe-
nomenology chimes with our own however, it seems that we can allow
that colourless extension is seen – it is co-seen with the objects that
border it. So, we can endorse Remainder, but deny Separateness, at least
with respect to perception. On this understanding, colour is only one-
sidely founded on extent, and not reciprocally. If Husserl is right, there is a
20A possible objection is that for Kant and Stumpf the set of sensory items relative to which a space is said
to ‘remain’ is the same as the set from which a space is separated, namely, the set of sensory items ﬁlling
that space – “in other words, Remainder and Separateness are two sides of the same coin”. Yet in my
reconstruction of Husserl, empty space is said to ‘remain’ when all sensory things ﬁlling that space are
removed, whereas it is said to be non-separated from the sensory things that constitute its boundaries. It
is this undue shift in the terms of comparison, the reviewer thinks, which allows me to say that in Husserl
there is Remainder without Separateness. I’m grateful to the reviewer for engaging so deeply with my
project in this paper. Sh/e is right that there is a ‘shift’, however, not an ‘undue’ one in my opinion. The
kind of non-separability I am attributing to Husserl pertains to the non-separability of contents in a pres-
entation. In line with this, the data I oﬀer for Remainder is not logical or conceptual – it is not a matter of
things and space as necessarily existing independently so that Remainder can be construed in terms of
the absence of the former – it is phenomenological. But there is a clear respect in which Kant’s subtrac-
tion argument also appeals to at least introspective phenomenology and this is what makes the bridge
to my reimagining of the subtraction argument.
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functional but not essential relation between space and things (and their
qualities).
Yet even if this much is granted this still leaves open whether there is a reci-
procal dependency between colour and extent with respect to what can be
thought or imagined, as Husserl of the Investigations teaches, and as Broad
thought obvious. Since Remainder is articulated in the context of the imagina-
tive subtraction argument, it is therefore worth returning to this.
4. Der Zwischenraum and Stumpf’s ‘subtraction’ argument
In the passage decomposed above, Husserl resolves to “face the facts
and begin with them”. The relevant fact is: we see empty space. How
does Stumpf, who after all rejects both Remainder and Separateness, deal
with this fact?
In the early pages of the Ursprung, Stumpf considers Kant’s claim that for
sensations to be referred to something outside me, and in order that I can rep-
resent them as outside and alongside one another, as not only diﬀerent, but in
diﬀerent places, the presentation of space must “lie at the foundation” (Über
den psychologischen Ursprung, 16). Stumpf identiﬁes two complicit commit-
ments in this claim:
i the assumption that when two places are represented, the intervening
places (Zwischenorte) are co-represented (mitvorstellen) and,
ii the thought that all the places in space are entered into a comprehensive
background (umfassenden Hintergrund)
This second point can appear striking to ‘usual’ or ‘everyday’ opinion
(‘gewöhnlichenMeinung’) we are told, but in fact (ii) is reducible to (i), according
to Stumpf. Why so? Representing a collection of places is for Stumpf represent-
ing space; space is not something ‘beside’ and ‘behind’ (‘neben und hinter’).
Stumpf then does grant that intervening places or interspaces are co-rep-
resented. But he insists that we do not in the main notice such interspaces –
‘in the main’ since he concedes that if the distance between two places is to
bemeasured, the gapmust be ‘considered’. In what waymust it be considered?
Stumpf, as we have seen, rejects Remainder. Nonetheless, he seems to
grant that intervening spaces are there, a fact that he describes as a remark-
able peculiarity of space. For Stumpf, however, they are there (and only poss-
ibly so) insofar as they are parts of wholes, wholes in which individual contents
are lawfully grouped together into one collective content (Gesamtinhalt).
Accordingly, the between, for Stumpf, is not, after all, what remains, or what
is left over. Rather, the between is part of a visual whole.
To get an imaginative grip on this idea, think of the ‘silences’ that form part
of rhythmic wholes. Such gaps or lacuna, when conceived as part of rhythmic
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wholes, are not best thought of as absences of sound at a time. Rather, qua
parts of rhythmic wholes they are part of the fabric of the rhythmic whole,
together with the weft and warp of the beat and pulse. That is to say, such
gaps are not best thought as auditory lacunae that sounds could ﬁll but
don’t. Why? For were sounds to take up such lacunae, the rhythmic pattern
would be destroyed. Or consider the weft and warp of a patch of stiﬀ linen
and the pattern thereby constituted. The gaps between the threads are not
best thought of places at which additional threads, now absent, could be.
This would change the pattern.21
I think Stumpf takes a similar line. Apparent betweenesses – spaces between
things – at leastwhen conceived as partof visualwholes, are not best conceived
as regions that could be occupied but aren’t – that is, as empty regions (cf. Husserl,
Thing and Space Lectures, §76, line 262). Such betweennesses only exist, qua
betweennesses, as part of visual wholes, forms that contain sensuous matter.
This then preserves the Stumpﬁan rejection of Remainder. Later in theUrsprung,
we are oﬀered an explicit unsettling of the plausibility of Kant’s subtraction
argument writ large. Before I spell this out; a clariﬁcation.
I have been freely using the terms ‘extent’ and ‘extension’ interchangeably
but it is worth conferring some order on our use of these terms. Husserl, as
noted earlier, ﬁnds Stumpf equivocating between the notion of a surface as
a two-dimensional manifold and the notion of the surface of a ‘formation’
or thing in three-dimensional space. To distinguish these, let us stipulate
that lines and two-dimensional areas have extent or are extended (2D) and
that only three-dimensional volumes have extension. When Husserl objects
to the equivocation on surfaces above, it is the equivocation between a 2-D
area that is extended, and the surface of a 3D thing that has extension in
space. But with this much clariﬁed, we can now say a little more about the
scope of co-seeing as discussed earlier.
When it is said that colour is co-seen with extent this might be thought to
apply only to coloured areas, as perhaps is the case with what David Katz des-
ignates as surface colour.22 But surely co-seeing ought to be acknowledged to
apply also in the case of volume colour. If so, then colour can be co-seen with
extent orwith extension. Now, above I suggested, after Husserl, that colourless
extension can also be seen so long as it is co-seenwith something, presumably
a coloured thing, which borders it. Here the presumption is that it is three-
dimensional colourless extension which can be seen. But this leaves open
the possibility that we cannot see colourless extent. This distinction sets the
stage for Stumpf’s challenge to Kant’s Remainder argument. Before that con-
sider a little further the import of the rejection of Separateness.
21Compare the illuminating discussion in Textor, “Apprehending a Multitude as a Unity”.
22For discussion of the distinction between surface and volume colour, see Katz’s authoritative 1935 The
World of Colour.
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We have so far allowed that empty space is co-seen with that which
borders it. But perhaps we can say more. Sometimes the seeing of that
which borders an empty region involves seeing it through that (or another)
empty region. For instance, consider the space now between you and this
page. The page constitutes the ‘far’ border of the interspace which, in
seeing the page, you co-see; you co-see the space through which the page
is seen. Why does it make sense to say that such space is co-seen?
Consider: were the empty region you see the page through completely in
darkness you would not see the page which borders the region through
which it is seen. This makes it plausible to suggest that the concept of a
visibly empty region through which objects are seen is one that is intelligible.
As we will shortly see, some theorists propose an allied conception; they
are inclined to say that empty regions are places that fall within the visual
ﬁeld, at which visible material is absent and where, were visible material
located there, it would be seen.23 I return to this formulation in closing. For
now, let us recap Kant’s ‘subtraction intuition’ call it, granting that empty
regions are co-seen with objects seen through them.
For Kant, on imaginatively subtracting the properties of substance, force,
sensation, colour, impenetrability etc. from the presentation of a body, some-
thing remains: extension. But recall that for Stumpf:
it is impossible to present space, extension and ﬁgure without any sensory qual-
ities. I know of only a single author, who in this point openly sides with Kant.
(P&E, 10, Textor and Leech trans.)
In the Ursprung, Stumpf challenges the subtraction argument thus. Supposing
all ‘colour’ were to be ‘subtracted’ from a region, we would be left, not with
colourless extension, but with black extension. Black, however, is a colour.
The subtraction cannot be completed! If this much is granted however, it
seems that Stumpf must concomitantly deny that we see coloured expanses
through light-ﬁlled empty regions, assuming, that is, that such regions are
visibly ‘colourless’. But this strikes me as itself tending toward the ‘psycholo-
gically indefensible’; the concept of colourless extension is not at all unintel-
ligible so long as the concept of co-seeing is kept in view. Without pursuing
this line of thought, I instead show that Stumpf’s objection to the subtraction
argument in fact gestures at a way of reconciling Stumpf with Kant, at least
once Remainder is allowed with respect to perception, and once it is
granted that empty regions are co-seen with the objects seen through them.
5. Reclaiming remainder and the all-embracing space
Stumpf’s insistence that the subtraction argument would lead only to the
apprehension of ‘blackness’, itself a colour, is of a piece with his insistence
23See Richardson, “Seeing Empty Space”, and Soteriou, “The Perception of Absence, Space and Time”.
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that the third dimension is also perceptually given and that depth is given
when a surface is visually presented. For it is arguably only on this assumption
that the conceit of ‘subtraction’might be thought to lead to blackness; what is
apprehended is a region in darkness; there is an absence of light at that place.
This assumption preserves the insistence that extension is essentially co-seen
with colour, an assumption that I have tried to unsettle by appeal to Husserl’s
descriptive phenomenology.
As I noted at the outset, however, Broad for one thinks that it is quite
obvious that there can be no extended mental image that lacks sensible qual-
ities; Stumpf says he knows of only one theorist who openly sides with Kant on
this matter. Instead of ‘siding with Kant’, let me take up a more circumscribed
question: What should we say about the fact that, for Kant, subtraction in
imagination does not yield, as Stumpf suggests it should, blackness? I oﬀer
two reﬂections on this question in closing, both of which draw contemporary
philosophy of perception and the Göttingen Husserl together.
There is reason, I think, to take Kant’s subtraction argument, which, as
Stumpf emphasizes, does not lead to blackness, to point instead to a distinc-
tive feature of imagined space which we might be apt to overlook. Let me
explain in what sense.
The content of our sensory imaginings, unlike the content of perceptual
experience, is often subject to the will – what we imagine is a matter of
what we intend to imagine and our ends in imagining. This is not to say
that sometimes imaginings occur unbidden – they plainly do. Nor is it to
suppose that perceptual experience does not involve agency. Perceivers typi-
cally exercise agency in determining which objects and events fall now within
their perceptual purview and ambit (I may move nearer to the yellow jug to
see if it is empty). But the agency involved in active projects of imagining –
such as the subtraction argument involves – is diﬀerent.
Soteriou, “The Past Made Present”, frames the diﬀerence between percep-
tion and imagination with respect to agency, and the attendant consequences
for content, in terms of a temporal diﬀerence. According to Soteriou, in
enquiring after when a perceptual experience occurs “one cites the temporal
location of the object of experience” (302). Thus, we might say: I see the
jug now because the object of my experience, the jug, happens to be
now where I am looking. This helps make salient a diﬀerence in cases of
imagining.
In the perceptual case, the temporal location of the perceptual act –when it
occurs – is the same as the temporal location of its object. The jug seen is here
now; this is a condition on its being seen.24 In the case of imagining however,
24It might be asked: What about seen a star up there now that died in the distant past? Is that now seen? I
would contend that in this case one sees an image of the star. The interested reader may consult Martin,
“Sounds and Images”.
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the temporal location of the act of imagining is not the same as the
temporal location of the object imagined. The latter is typically not determi-
nate at all.
[W]hen you imagine your friend walking towards you, you needn’t thereby be
imagining that her approach occurs at the actual time of your act of imagining.
You could be imagining a future encounter, or you could be imagining a past
encounter you wished for, and indeed the question of the time of the imagined
event could be left entirely open.
(306)
Some such imaginings may not be intentional. They may be expressive – as
when a wished-for past experience is imagined. The subtractive case,
however, is plainly intentional. What is the signiﬁcance of this fact?
As we have noted, what one imagines depends on one’s ends in imagining
– why one is engaged in that process. As with temporal location however,
where the act of imagining occurs, and the space imagined – the imaginal
space your friend traverses in walking towards you say – are also distinct.
For instance, there is no visible path that connects where you are now to
the imaginal space you imagine your friend to traverse at some imagined tem-
poral present, at least in the limited sense that you do not see your friend walk
through a visibly empty region that you could also now traverse to greet him.
Likewise, there is no region that he is seen through. Instead, a perceptual
space is represented. But this represented space is not the kind of space
that light can fail to enter, as when night falls.
Certainly, we can imagine the subtraction argument to terminate in black-
ness, perhaps with the intention of exploring Stumpf’s own rendering of it.
But importantly the space thereby imagined is not one that could have been
otherwise – namely, ﬁlled with light. This is because the content of the
experience depends on the act that generates it. Thus, although in imagining
your friend walking towards you, he is represented as seen from a particular
location, you are not path-connected to him through a co-seen light-ﬁlled
region, through which you see him, and through which you could move
to greet him. Let us say then that the subject of the act of imagining does
not inhabit the place from which imagined objects are represented as
being perceived.
It strikes me that these reﬂections gesture in the direction of some form of
phenomenal disjunctivism with respect to empty space. In the perceptual
case, empty space is seen through: it is co-seen with the objects seen
through it. Remainder is assumed, but without Separateness. In the imaginary
case however, objects are only represented as seen from a particular location.
Naturally, a great deal more has to be said to substantiate and make plausible
these claims – a task for another occasion. But if this can be completed, as I
think it can, it should I think be allowed, with Broad and Stumpf, that, with
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respect to imagination (to what is thus ‘thinkable’), colour and extent are reci-
procally dependent, while, in the case of perception, only the one-sided
dependence of colour and extent or extension holds. Importantly, however,
Kant’s subtraction argument endorses both Remainder and Separateness. So,
is there any way to make sense of both these claims in a way that nonetheless
circumvents Stumpf’s argument? I think there is.
Husserl’s descriptive phenomenology recommends that we see the entirety
of space (2). This recalls Kant:
[W]e can represent to ourselves only one space; and, if we speak of diverse
spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space…
these parts cannot precede the one all-embracing space, as being, as it were, con-
stituents out of which it can be composed; on the contrary, they can be thought
only as in it. Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and therefore the general
notion of spaces, depends solely on [the introduction of] limitations.
(A25)
Recent neo-Kantian work in the Strawsonian tradition suggests that we should
likewise recognize limits or bounds that are sensory. In particular, it is argued
that we experience our visual ﬁeld as bounded and that such bounds or limit-
ations are perceptually salient to us as structural features of visual experience.
Further, in experiencing our visual ﬁeld as thus bounded, it is said that we are
aware of our visual sensory limitations insofar as it seems to us that there is
more to be sensed than we are currently sensing. Richardson, “Seeing
Empty Space” clariﬁes:
The claim is that on a cloudless day, looking out to sea on a deserted beach, it
would still seem to one that there was more to be seen than one currently could
see. It would still seem to you that way in outer space. One is aware of the limits
ﬁxed by the visual ﬁeld in the sense that the space it delimits seems to be
limited. It seems, always, as if there is more to be seen, beyond these limits
… This, perhaps, is what Kant meant by the claim that space is an ‘inﬁnite
given magnitude’.
(234)
Here what is given is a sub-region of a larger space – a region delimited by the
boundaries of one’s visual ﬁeld, the limitations of which one is manifestly
aware of as boundaries or limits. Insofar as one is thus aware of them, one
might say that such regions are not co-perceived, but co-present in experi-
ence. In Ideas, Husserl describes the co-present as a ‘constant halo’ around
the ﬁeld of perception, adding:
[I]t is not necessary that […] objects be found directly in my ﬁeld of perception.
Along with the ones now perceived, other actual objects are there for me as
determinate, as more or less well known, without being themselves perceived,
indeed, present in any other mode of intuition. I can let my attention wander
away from the writing table which was just now seen and noticed, out
through the unseen parts of the room which are behind my back, to the
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verandah, into the garden, to the children in the arbour, etc., to all the Objects I
directly “know of” as being there and here in the surroundings of which there is
also consciousness.
(§27, “Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology”, 51–52)
For contemporary ‘structural’ theorists, however, it is not simply the knowledge
that other regions are co-present with the sub-region of space ofwhich one has
perceptual awareness that is explanatorily relevant, but the way this knowl-
edge manifests itself in our perceptual awareness. Insofar as we are implicitly
aware that there is more to be sensed, we are also aware of our visual ﬁeld
as being limited or bounded. And it is in virtue of our awareness of such bound-
aries that empty regions are said to be seen. We are aware that visible objects,
were they to fall within the bounds of the visual ﬁeld and be located at regions
that we would otherwise describe as ‘empty’, would be seen.
This might at once suggest that Remainder is advanced without Separate-
ness – empty regions are characterized as those where visible objects would
be seen should they fall within the bounds of the visual ﬁeld. But subtraction,
recall, is a matter of active imagining. So, is there not a way to intend the
instructed subtractions bearing in mind the conceptual material that the
structuralist theorist makes available with her notion of a structural feature?
If so, can we thus ‘side with’ Kant? It is tempting to think so. For if structural
features can be imagined to survive subtraction, then Kant’s Remainder
claim can be itself re-imagined and reclaimed, and arguably without Separate-
ness too, for such structural features pertain to the form of experience not to
its content or matter.
I don’t have the space for words to explore this possibility, though it does
suggest a conclusion in the form of a second descriptive phenomenological
route to unsettling Stumpf’s Charge. At the same time however, I have
suggested that the Charge invites a diﬀerent (partly compatible) conclusion
concerning empty space, as well the interspaces between things that in
being part of visual wholes we might not otherwise conceive as ‘empty’:
Empty space is co-seen insofar as we see things through it, Stumpf’s subtrac-
tive imaginings aside, where everything goes black.
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